Hire me to work myself out of the job, so your team keeps going without me.I started by building an internet service in Lake Havasu City.I build platforms other people have to live with.Nobody should have to learn my machinery to do their job.If your people have to learn your platform, your platform is the problem.Hire me to work myself out of the job, so your team keeps going without me.
At a glance
CTO and Field CTO for companies of two hundred to a thousand people.
I lead technology as people and organization work. The talent problems and the system problems get solved together, by the same leader.
65 people, $20 millionVP and GM of Data at Xero: engineering, platform, analytics, and enablement.
$300,000 to $50,000Yearly cost of Ticketmaster sales reporting after the rebuild, at 30-second freshness.
CTO, RadixEngineering and product from September 2025, after an advisory start.
$18 millionCompuNet's sale to First Advantage, after I moved its operation onto the web.
People and organization
Xero. I worked with managers through a change in the performance framework, supported the people it affected, and protected team capacity. Data-organization retention stayed at 95% or higher, and the successor I developed is still in the role. A dozen teams moved onto the shared platform: every model, and every ETL job to dbt or our custom data movement platform. MicroStrategy and the Redshift warehouse were retired, and hundreds of people use the new platform every week. Revenue Operations and 20-25 product analysts became development partners, and both groups stood behind the shared framework within 18 months.
Radix. Clearer roles and career expectations, delivery pods, a principal architect I recruited, and one plan that covered staffing, leave, and architecture together. The teams carried on after the engagement.
Ticketmaster / Live Nation. I led a data engineering organization of about 45 people.
School board. We turned established practice into policy the next board can understand and use.
I have run Scale Data since 2024, building software and the platforms it runs on. That work included an engagement as CTO at Radix in 2025. Before that I was VP and GM of Data at Xero, with a remit of 65 people and a combined-organization budget of about $20 million.
I'm looking for a permanent CTO or Field CTO role at a company of two hundred to a thousand people, responsible for the technology, the teams that build it, and how the rest of the company uses it. Until then I lead client work through Scale Data.
Across those roles, I have worked with people who understand their business but cannot get what they need from the technology around them. Their existing ways of working often contain knowledge that a replacement needs to preserve. I want to understand that with them, and give the people responsible for the result enough room and support to make decisions of their own.
The work
1995 to 1997, Lake Havasu City
LINKnet
Following whole story
I started LINKnet in 1995 to provide dial-up internet in Lake Havasu City, a town of 30,000. The work included financing, carrier contracts, premises, and the hardware and software needed to run the service. Commercial modem racks were too expensive for the business, so I built custom racks for 48 external modems.
Running the service also meant billing customers, answering their questions, and keeping the desk and website working. Other people helped across those responsibilities, and everyone took on what needed doing. We opened in May 1995, and I operated the business until its sale in summer 1997.
At nineteen I started a dial-up ISP in a town of 30,000. Getting an internet service running meant finding a location, arranging financing and carrier contracts, and building the technical systems the business depended on. Commercial modem racks cost too much, so I built custom racks for 48 external modems.
The people helping me covered support, the website, and the desk, with everyone taking on what needed doing. We opened in May 1995, and I ran the business until selling it in summer 1997.
A small business makes the relationship between the machinery and the people very visible. Custom modem racks helped make the service affordable, but support, billing, and the work at the desk still had to fit around what we built. I was learning how much of a technical decision is carried by someone who was not in the room when it was made, and how much useful knowledge sits with the person who has to explain a problem to a customer.
The custom modem racks made LINKnet affordable to start. When I assess that kind of decision now, I weigh the purchase price against the work of diagnosing faults, helping customers, and keeping the service running when its builder is unavailable. A low purchase price does not tell you how much attention a system will need. The useful question is whether the people operating it have the information and support to carry that responsibility.
The people covering support and daily operations need a part in those decisions because they will discover consequences that are difficult to see from the equipment rack. Their experience can change the design before those consequences become normal working conditions.
I judge a technical shortcut partly by who inherits the inconvenience. If I save money on hardware but leave the person at the desk unable to answer a customer's question without finding me, some of that saving has been paid for by their time and confidence. There are circumstances in which that is the only affordable starting point, but I should recognize the dependency and make a plan to reduce it.
I build companies so they stop depending on their founding engineer. Early on a business may need that person intensely; as it grows, other people's ability to run and improve the service is part of what the founder has to build.
At CompuNet, the information we collected helped freight carriers decide which brokers to work with. I stabilized the database, then moved data collection, report requests, and delivery into a web application in 2000. Staff could enter information directly, brokers could update their profiles, and customers could request reports through the same system, including reports delivered by fax.
The products expanded to include carrier-performance reporting for brokers, giving the business information to sell to both sides of the market. The move to the web came a decade before it became the norm in freight. As my role grew into chief engineer and CTO, I hired programmers and worked with a database administrator who could run the existing systems while I developed new products.
CompuNet sold information that helped carriers decide which brokers to work with. In 2000 I moved the whole operation into a web application, bringing data collection, report ordering, and delivery into the same system a decade before that became the norm in freight. Staff could enter information more efficiently, brokers could update their own profiles, and customers could request the reports they needed. Automated fax reporting ran within that platform.
We added carrier-performance reporting for brokers, creating a two-sided information marketplace with products to sell to both sides. As my role developed from IT generalist into chief engineer and CTO, I hired programmers and worked with a database administrator who could take responsibility for the running systems while I developed new products.
The company reported $5,292,770 in revenue for the year ended 30 June 2004, and First Advantage bought it that November for $18 million.
The significance of moving CompuNet to the web was that collecting information and asking for a report could become parts of the same operation. Staff, brokers, and customers could participate directly in different parts of that process, and the information could support products for both sides of the market. The interface mattered because it changed who could do the work and what the business could sell, well beyond changing how an existing report arrived.
At CompuNet I would distinguish the initial need to stabilize an unreliable application from the opportunity to change the information business. A replacement can be justified by reducing operating risk; a broader investment needs a case for the work and products it makes possible. I would assess those purposes separately so that fixing the immediate problem does not become the limit of the plan.
At CompuNet, the web platform brought collection, requests, and delivery together, while the products expanded to serve carriers and brokers. In a market where timing matters, that change in the operating model is a more useful measure of the work than how new the technology was.
Before I back a modernization, I ask what the business will be able to do afterwards. Replacing an unsupported platform or cutting risk can be reason enough, and I say so plainly. A new interface on the same constraints is a different proposition from changing how information enters the business, how customers request it, and which products can be sold.
The CompuNet work matters to me because those changes were connected. The opportunity came from treating the application as part of the information business and understanding how the people on both sides could participate. The commercial timing was part of the technical judgment, particularly in an industry where being years earlier changes what is possible.
At Ticketmaster, my work developed from warehouse engineering into leadership of an organization of about 45 people. I rebuilt the data model and pipelines behind client analytics for about 10,000 venues, promoters, and artists, improving latency, performance, and reporting detail. The earlier work also included financial clearing-house exports, warehouse migrations, and the fraud team's training and inference data.
The 2019 CDC program brought sales reporting across roughly 500 ticketing databases to about five minutes behind live sales. I led the consumer-side work and wrote reporting SQL, while a principal engineer and his team built the Snowflake path. I also built a Kafka Streams alternative, which we retired when the Snowflake implementation proved easier to scale and maintain.
During the pandemic, the teams delivered a Databricks platform and sales and attendance products in six months. I designed its development framework with the engineers using it, allowing them to work in SQL while the platform handled scheduling, dependencies, and recovery. The comparable sales-reporting workload's annual cost fell from about $300,000 to $50,000, with about 30-second freshness.
My work grew from warehouse and reporting engineering into leadership of a data engineering organization of about 45 people. I rebuilt the data model and pipelines behind client analytics, improving latency and performance while making much more detailed reporting possible for a platform serving about 10,000 venues, promoters, and artists. I also wrote the financial clearing-house exports, worked through the SQL Server to Teradata and Teradata to Snowflake migrations, and supplied the fraud team's training and inference data.
The 2019 CDC sales-reporting program had its own engineering problems: keeping reports current across roughly 500 ticketing databases during busy on-sales, reconstructing the business rules behind the numbers, and validating updates across related tables. I led the consumer-side work and wrote the reporting SQL alongside a parallel Kafka Streams implementation. A principal engineer and his team built the Snowflake path we ultimately kept, with reporting about five minutes behind live sales.
During the pandemic, the next assignment was to replace the platform under severe cost pressure. In six months, the teams delivered a Databricks platform with sales and attendance data products, working by December 2020. I designed the development framework with the engineers who would use it, so they could build in SQL while the platform handled scheduling, dependencies, and recovery. The comparable sales-reporting workload reached about 30-second freshness, with annual cost falling from about $300,000 to $50,000.
These projects changed different things for the people relying on them. More reporting detail gave clients a better view of their business; fresher sales and attendance data mattered while an event was happening; and the development framework gave engineers a way to contribute using the SQL and business knowledge they already had. The useful measure of the platform was the work those people could now do, including the work of the engineers who would have to maintain it.
The pandemic platform let engineers contribute through SQL and business rules they already understood, while the framework carried recurring execution and recovery work. Under that deadline, the judgment was where to spend the team's learning effort and where shared engineering could absorb it. A framework takes time to build and support; its value depends on whether that effort reduces repeated work for the engineers delivering the data products.
I would apply the same reasoning to competing designs. The comparison has to include how other people will change and support each path after the original authors move on. My familiarity with my own implementation is useful during evaluation, but it is a poor substitute for the organization's ability to maintain it.
In a crisis I make the cost to the team visible, and I leave behind a system people can sustain once the pressure passes. The pandemic delivery matters because of the platform and data products the teams delivered under those constraints, including a development framework that made their existing expertise useful quickly.
I would be equally direct about whose design survives. If the people responsible for operating a system can more readily scale and maintain a colleague's approach, the time I spent on mine does not create an obligation to keep it. A technical leader has to make it possible for that comparison to be candid, particularly when the person arguing for the other approach reports to them.
I joined Xero to lead data enrichment, then took responsibility for engineering, platform, architecture, product analytics, and enablement across a combined organization of 65 people. Revenue Operations and product analysts worked with us on a shared modeling platform that incorporated their existing tools. We established dbt for new modeling, and both groups were using and supporting the framework after about 18 months.
Product analytics involved understanding background processes and accountants' actions as well as browser clicks. I directed the move toward shared Kafka-to-Snowflake ingestion and event enrichment with customer and business context. The enriched Mixpanel path was running in parallel at handover while adoption continued.
I also led the wider CDC architecture evaluation and worked with the science lead on data foundations and company-level planning. Managers received support through changes to performance expectations, and dedicated teams had protected delivery capacity. I developed a successor before leaving in July 2024; the new CDC-to-S3 path was not yet operating, and the engineers continued the roadmap through delivery around late 2025.
I joined to lead data enrichment and later took responsibility for engineering, platform, architecture, product analytics, and enablement across a combined organization of 65 people. Revenue Operations and product analysts became development partners in a shared modeling platform: we combined their existing tooling with the engineering framework and made dbt the standard for new work. It took about 18 months for both groups to be using and supporting it.
Product analytics was a separate part of the remit. I worked with product leaders and the team on instrumentation that could explain background processes and actions by accountants as well as clicks in a browser. We moved toward shared Kafka-to-Snowflake ingestion and enriched events with customer, billing, regional, and marketing context before sending them to Mixpanel.
For the wider data platform, I led the CDC architecture evaluation across roughly 800 sources, including about 600 SQL Server shards. The design needed to follow customers moving between shards and support both analytical models and the data foundations I was planning with the science lead. Membership of the senior leadership team brought those choices into company-level planning with the CEO, CPTO, and Finance.
The delivery organization mattered as much as the architecture. I worked with managers on performance expectations, protected teams' capacity, and negotiated a vendor contract that declined as the replacement was due to grow. I developed a successor and stayed through the transition. The new CDC-to-S3 path was not operating when I left; the team continued the roadmap and delivered the replacement around late 2025.
A shared platform asks people to place part of their working day in someone else's hands. Analysts who have built their own tools already understand needs that may be missing from the central team's plans, so their participation affects the design as well as adoption. The organizational work belongs in the same account: people need support through a change, managers need understandable expectations, and the teams building the replacement need time that remains available when other priorities become urgent.
The Xero platform needed to serve analysts who already had working tools and useful knowledge. I weigh that existing capability alongside the advantages of a shared framework, because standardization can improve support while also taking away something a team depends on. The decision needs people who can explain both sides. Adoption is meaningful when the replacement helps them do useful work and gives them ownership they can sustain.
The same standard applies to the plan behind the platform. If a replacement matters enough to fund, the people delivering it need protected capacity and an explicit decision when that capacity is diverted. A manager should be able to bring the resulting tradeoff into the discussion while there is still a choice to make, rather than leave the engineers to reconcile incompatible expectations on their own.
When people don't adopt a platform, I first ask whether the platform understands their work. The people who kept the function running get a clear account of what improves, what gets harder, and how they'll be supported. A central team's architectural preference does not settle those questions.
When a team's capacity is moved, I revisit the date or the scope as a leadership decision, so the contradiction doesn't land on the people least able to change it. When I hand over a program, I want my successor and the teams to inherit the authority and support to make those decisions, as well as the architecture and roadmap.
My Radix engagement began with an assessment of engineering delivery and AI opportunities and developed into the CTO role. I used Claude Code to investigate about 90 repositories, checking its findings through direct code review. The architectural work included separating the underwriting application's frontend from legacy layers while keeping its financial logic intact.
Azure-to-AWS consolidation had to fit alongside product development because both depended on the same engineers. In Kosovo, we worked through dependencies, capacity, leave, and staffing for the plan that went into executive budgeting. I established delivery pods and clearer responsibilities and recruited a principal architect to work with the organization. The engineers wrote the production code, and implementation continued after the engagement.
The engagement developed from an assessment of engineering delivery and AI opportunities into responsibility for engineering and product. I used Claude Code to investigate about 90 repositories and checked its findings through direct code review. Across the product estate, the decisions included how to separate an acquired underwriting application's new frontend from legacy layers while preserving its financial logic.
I put Azure-to-AWS consolidation into the product roadmap because it depended on the same engineers as the product work. In Kosovo, we worked through capacity, dependencies, leave, and staffing to build the plan that went into executive budgeting. Delivery pods, clearer roles and responsibilities, and a principal architect I recruited gave the teams a structure for carrying it forward. The engineers wrote the production code, with implementation continuing after my engagement.
Understanding an existing system means finding both the constraints that make it difficult to change and the knowledge it has accumulated. Financial logic can remain valuable even when the layers around it have become tightly coupled. The delivery plan also has to recognize that migration and product work may need the same people, whose experience, leave, and other commitments cannot be treated as details to reconcile after the roadmap is approved.
The Radix assessment distinguished valuable financial logic from the coupling around it. Preserving that logic behind clearer boundaries offered a route for incremental change, while reproducing it at the same time would add another source of risk. I would weigh that choice against how engineers can verify the behavior and what the product needs to change next. The architecture and the available delivery capacity have to support the same route.
I would then put the architecture and product plan through the same capacity discussion. A cloud migration cannot have an independent schedule if it draws on the engineers needed for product delivery. The people doing that work need to be present when the tradeoffs are made, while executive planning still has room to respond.
An architecture proposal is incomplete until it explains how the organization can get from the existing system to the proposed one while continuing to serve customers. The target diagram may be elegant, but the route depends on business rules, dependencies, and people whose knowledge is often concentrated in the parts everyone most wants to replace. I would want the proposal to show where that knowledge is preserved and how the engineers can verify each change.
A plan that schedules the same people against product delivery and migration as though each has their full attention is making a promise they cannot keep. It is the leadership team's responsibility to resolve that conflict before treating it as a delivery failure. The engineers need room to disagree with the plan without that disagreement being read as a lack of ambition.
Through Scale Data, I work with clients on their software and the platforms supporting it. At Stout Tent, unreliable data and software were affecting the crews' work. I interviewed users, built interim reporting, and developed a replacement operations application for its April 2026 launch, covering crew scheduling, travel, equipment, and data entry. We checked changes against festival operations as people used the application.
I built the shared GCP hosting platform and migrated existing client applications from AWS. It provides application isolation, access control, delivery, backups, and monitoring. My development tooling directs coding agents through bounded specifications, isolated worktrees, and coordinated reviews, while keeping production credentials and promotion outside their control.
A colleague and I also connected production errors to a workflow that investigates the code and proposes repairs as draft pull requests. The next stage will let the person who reported a problem try a proposed repair and request revisions; that acceptance loop is still to be built.
Claude Certified Architect Professional, 26 August 2026. CCAR-P.
At Stout Tent, the starting point was unreliable operational data and software the crews could not depend on. I interviewed users and built interim reporting from MongoDB and Google Sheets in Snowflake, then developed the replacement application for its April 2026 launch. The work covered crew scheduling, travel, equipment logistics, and data entry, with changes checked against festival operations as people used the application.
I also built the GCP hosting platform and migrated existing client applications from AWS. It carries isolation, access control, delivery, backups, and monitoring across the applications. Alongside it I developed a way to direct coding agents through bounded specifications, isolated worktrees, and coordinated reviews, with production credentials and promotion outside their control.
A colleague and I connected production errors to a repair workflow that investigates the code and proposes changes as draft pull requests. The next part is a way for the person who reported a problem to try the proposed repair and ask for revisions; that acceptance loop is still to be built.
At ArtsEd West I developed membership and payment workflows, along with a publishing process my cofounders could run through Google Sheets. They can propose changes and review the results before publication, retaining responsibility for what the organization says.
Claude Certified Architect Professional, 26 August 2026. CCAR-P.
Coding agents make the distance between describing a change and seeing an implementation much shorter. The person using the software still has a different question: will this change help with the work they were trying to do? That is why I am interested in the acceptance part of the repair workflow. A draft pull request is useful to an engineer, but the person who reported the problem needs a practical way to try the result and influence what happens next.
The error-to-draft workflow produces a proposed repair for an engineer to review. I would judge further automation by whether it helps investigate and assess a change, including a useful route back when the proposal is wrong. Moving work out of implementation has little value if it simply makes review harder, so the engineering boundary matters as much as the model's ability to produce code.
At ArtsEd West, using Google Sheets for proposed publishing changes keeps that decision with the cofounders who know the organization. The next step in the repair workflow applies the same consideration to someone reporting a software problem, although that acceptance loop still needs to be built.
The ability to generate more code increases the importance of deciding which changes deserve to exist. If engineers become responsible for reviewing a growing queue of plausible implementations while the people asking for them remain unable to try the result, much of the supposed gain may have moved into someone else's workload. I want to understand that whole process before treating generation speed as a useful measure of development.
I also do not think a successful test run is enough to decide that a repair helped its user. The tests can establish behavior we already knew to check; the person trying to complete the work may reveal a misunderstanding in the request or the proposed fix. That person needs a meaningful place in the workflow, with human responsibility for what reaches production and a way to ask for another attempt.
My management work has included setting technical direction, agreeing on delivery capacity, and helping managers apply expectations consistently. At Xero, I established dedicated teams with protected capacity and worked with managers through a change in the performance framework, including support for the people affected. I also developed a successor before handing over the data organization.
At Radix, we brought product dependencies, staffing, and engineers' leave into the same delivery plan. Clearer responsibilities and career expectations gave managers and engineers a basis for discussing their work. These responsibilities sat alongside architecture and executive planning, with the teams continuing implementation after my engagement ended.
My management work has included setting technical direction, agreeing on delivery capacity, and helping managers apply expectations consistently. At Xero, I established dedicated teams with protected capacity and worked with managers through a change in the performance framework, including support for the people affected. I also developed a successor before handing over the data organization.
At Radix, we brought product dependencies, staffing, and engineers' leave into the same delivery plan. Clearer responsibilities and career expectations gave managers and engineers a basis for discussing their work. These responsibilities sat alongside architecture and executive planning, with the teams continuing implementation after my engagement ended.
Much of leading technical work is understanding what people are trying to accomplish, what they already know, and what is getting in their way. The architecture matters, but so do the responsibilities and expectations around it. I want the people doing the work to understand the decisions that affect them and to have room to challenge those decisions.
People need enough clarity to make decisions and enough trust to say when the expectations no longer fit. A role framework can help a manager explain what good work looks like, but it also needs to help the person being assessed understand how to develop and challenge an interpretation. The quality of that conversation matters because the consequences extend beyond the work currently on the roadmap.
A roles framework has to be useful to the person doing the work as well as to the manager assessing it. I weigh consistency against the judgment needed when a role or an expectation does not fit the circumstances. Too little clarity leaves people guessing about decisions that affect their careers; too much prescription can prevent them from exercising the responsibility we say we want them to take. The framework should make those differences discussable.
Performance expectations need the same care. I want people to hear about a concern while there is time to understand it and act, with specific examples and room to explain what I may have missed. The framework should improve that conversation, rather than become a reason for the manager to avoid having it.
If a team only feels safe telling me what it thinks I want to hear, my confidence in the plan is based on incomplete information. I need to consider my own part in that before asking people to be more candid. The response to an inconvenient finding teaches the team whether it is useful to bring the next one, particularly when it challenges a decision I have already supported.
I also think leaders should be careful about praising exceptional effort when it repeatedly compensates for decisions they have left unresolved. People can choose to do difficult, urgent work and take pride in it; that does not make their willingness an unlimited planning resource. I want managers to be able to discuss capacity, development, and the effect on the people doing the work without having to present those concerns as delivery excuses.
I am a cofounder, Business Manager, and Technology Director at ArtsEd West, where I have worked since June 2025. Alongside business operations and planning, I built membership, payment, and publishing workflows. My cofounders can propose website changes through Google Sheets and review them before publication, keeping responsibility for what the organization says.
At Desert Marigold School, my board service began around 2020, first as Treasurer and later as Board President. The work includes governance, finance, long-range planning, and support for the executive director. I have also worked on turning established practices into policies that remain useful as board membership changes.
Desert Marigold School
Board service from around 2020. Treasurer, then Board President. Term ends November 2026.
I serve on the board of a public Waldorf charter school, where the work includes governance, financial oversight, and supporting the executive director. Much of our recent work has been turning established practices into policies the next board can understand and use. The people who follow us need access to that knowledge without depending on everyone who held it being available.
I use AI to organize the documents and support that work, with decisions remaining with the board and legal review with counsel. I remain responsible for reviewing and sending the material I prepare.
ArtsEd West
Cofounder. Business Manager and Technology Director from June 2025.
ArtsEd West connects educators and teaching artists across Arizona. My part covers business planning and budgets as well as membership, payments, and the technology supporting them. The other cofounders need to be able to develop the organization and change what it publishes without waiting for me to make every edit.
They submit website changes through Google Sheets and review what an agent prepares in a nonproduction environment. That keeps editorial decisions with the people who know the work, using tools they are already comfortable with. Our inaugural ALL AZ Summit took place on 11 September 2026.
A board or a small nonprofit needs the knowledge behind its decisions to remain available as people come and go. Writing down a policy or giving a colleague a way to update the website can make the work easier to share, provided the people responsible still understand what is being decided. Technology is useful here when it gives them more room to exercise that responsibility.
In board and nonprofit work, preparing information more efficiently can give people more time to exercise judgment. I weigh that benefit against whether the next person can understand the decision and carry the responsibility. A publishing process that colleagues can use themselves has value beyond saving my time, provided they can review what it will say and ask for changes before it becomes public.
If the people responsible for an organization's work have to come through me for routine changes, I have made myself part of their operating constraint. I make sure the teams I lead can make routine changes without me: tools they understand, a way to review consequences, and the knowledge they'll need when someone else takes over. That still leaves a role for technical support, without making every decision a technical request.
People. ArtsEd West's cofounders publish through Google Sheets while an agent stages their changes for review. Stout Tent's crews work from an app built with them. The person who reports a production problem will be able to try the proposed fix and ask for another attempt; that part is being built now.
Systems. Agents work in isolated environments to bounded specifications. Production credentials and promotion stay outside their control, and a human reviews what ships.
The pattern
The word harness comes up often now in conversations about AI agents and harness engineering. I have been thinking about harnesses for intelligence since long before I was directing agents, and for me they begin with clear information: what the work requires, how the platforms and tools support it, and where someone has room to exercise their judgment.
A document defining roles and responsibilities for data, software, machine learning, and QA engineers at different levels is a harness in that sense. It gives people context for what is expected of them and how their responsibility can develop. I also want people to be able to see the expectations for other roles, so they can understand a different kind of work and have a go at it if they want to.
When I spend time helping people understand a platform and how it is meant to be used, I also learn where the explanation is unclear and where the system is unnecessarily difficult. Those questions feed back into the design, making the harness clearer and simpler as it matures.
I am doing the same work with AI agents, choosing among frontier model families and effort levels for the job at hand. I adjust the context and direction as I see how each handles the work, much as I have had to learn when different people need more support, a challenge, or room to try another approach.
When
Who
What they could do
What supported it
2000
Staff, carriers, and brokers
Collect data and request reports through a web interface
Shared data, report generation, and automated delivery
2004 to 2021
Ticketmaster clients
More detailed financial, sales, and attendance reporting
A rebuilt data model and reporting pipelines
2019
Teams managing busy ticket sales
Use current sales numbers during an on-sale
Change capture, reporting rules, and validation
2020
Ticketmaster engineers
Develop data products in SQL notebooks
Spark, scheduling, recovery, and deployment
2022
Xero analysts and product teams
Build and own their models
dbt, the vault, ownership metadata, and shared support
2021 to 2024
Xero product teams
Understand user actions and background product activity
Instrumentation, event ingestion, and customer enrichment
2025
Radix engineering and product teams
Plan product changes and a cloud migration together
Architectural boundaries, capacity planning, and clear responsibilities
2025
Radix engineers and managers
Understand expectations and discuss career development
Shared roles and responsibilities across disciplines and levels
2026
Stout Tent operations
Coordinate crews, travel, and equipment
A replacement application and shared hosting platform
2026
ArtsEd West cofounders
Propose and review publishing changes through Google Sheets
An agent that stages their changes for review
2026
Coding agents and the engineers directing them
Work on bounded changes in parallel
Isolated development environments, tests, and review
What I want the work to leave behind
The point of this work is that an analyst can answer a question while it still matters, a crew manager can trust the plan in front of them, and an engineer can change a system without needing its author in the room. I want the people doing that work to have a say in the systems they depend on, and the team building those systems to have the authority, support, and technical understanding to keep making them better.
The architecture, the budget, and the way a team is managed all contribute to that result, so I want responsibility for how they fit together. If that is the kind of work you need help with, tell me what your people are trying to do and what is getting in their way.
Technology executive and engineering leader with thirty years across software products, data platforms, and engineering organizations. Former CTO at Radix, VP and GM of Data at Xero, and Director of Data Engineering at Ticketmaster; now leading client delivery through Scale Data. My responsibilities have included technical direction, executive planning, budgets, vendor agreements, management, and hands-on engineering.
Professional experience
Scale Data
Founder and Principal 2024 to present Phoenix, Arizona
Lead client discovery, technical roadmaps, architecture, and delivery with a small senior engineering team, translating business requirements into scoped software and platform work.
Interviewed Stout Tent's users and built interim reporting from MongoDB and Google Sheets in Snowflake before developing its replacement operations application for an April 2026 launch.
Built crew scheduling, travel, equipment logistics, and operational data workflows with Django, React, PostgreSQL, and Bryntum Scheduler Pro. Checked changes with the people using the application in festival operations, with AI used in development and within the product.
Designed and built a shared GCP hosting platform in January 2026, migrating existing applications from AWS with application isolation, access control, GitOps delivery, backups, and monitoring.
Built development tooling that directs coding agents through bounded specifications, isolated worktrees, and coordinated reviews. Production credentials and promotion remain outside the agents' control.
Co-developed a repair workflow that investigates errors from GlitchTip and proposes changes as draft GitHub pull requests, with Vertex AI among the model options. The next stage is a way for the person reporting a problem to try a proposed repair and request revisions.
Radix
Chief Technology Officer 1 September to 3 December 2025 Advisory through Scale Data, July to August 2025 Scottsdale, Arizona
Held company-wide engineering and product responsibility across Analytics, Underwriting (redIQ), and RealRents in an advisory engagement that developed into the CTO role.
Used Claude Code to investigate about 90 repositories and hundreds of tables, checking its findings through direct code review to inform architectural assessment and delivery planning.
Defined domain-oriented API boundaries so a new React frontend could separate from legacy .NET while preserving the financial logic initially in the database. Led architectural reviews with the engineers responsible for production implementation.
Put Azure-to-AWS consolidation inside the product roadmap, sequencing replacement and retirement against product delivery and the capacity of the same engineers. Replatforming continued after the engagement.
Worked with about 25 engineers in Kosovo and a small platform team in Scottsdale on a two-year plan covering dependencies, effort, leave, and staffing for 2026 executive budgeting. Recruited a principal architect in Germany to work with the Kosovo organization.
Established delivery pods and clearer responsibilities across engineering, analytics, and science. Simplified titles, performance expectations, and career progression so managers and engineers had a more usable framework for discussing their work.
Xero
Vice President / General Manager, Data 11 January 2021 to 26 July 2024 Initially General Manager, Data Enrichment Melbourne and Phoenix
Led engineering, platform, architecture, product analytics, and enablement across a combined organization of 65 people and a budget of about $20 million. The remit expanded from an eight-person enrichment team through hiring and organizational consolidation.
Selected to the senior leadership team, bringing data and AI into company-level planning with the CEO, CPTO, and Finance. Connected platform direction and the operational data layer to science and intelligent-product requirements with the science lead.
Developed a three-year roadmap spanning shared modeling, product analytics, ingestion, and legacy retirement. Maintained delivery with the science lead through a six months gap in the leadership line above the teams.
Made Revenue Operations and product analysts development partners in a shared modeling platform. Incorporated their existing tooling, selected dbt Core on the Data Vault estate, and established ownership and scheduling through Prefect and DataHub.
Supported adoption over about 18 months, with Revenue Operations and about 20-25 product analysts using and supporting the shared framework. The engineers built the production pipelines and models.
Directed product analytics toward shared Kafka-to-Snowflake ingestion, with Protocol Buffers used for product events and enrichment from customer, billing, regional, and marketing context. The enriched Mixpanel path ran in parallel at handover while adoption continued.
Led architectural evaluation across roughly 800 sources, including about 600 SQL Server shards, for a Kafka-based CDC design with Go source agents and Iceberg on S3 and Snowflake targets. Engineers owned production implementation; CDC-to-S3 was not operating at departure.
Established tiger teams with protected capacity and negotiated a three-year Fivetran agreement that declined as the internal replacement matured. Developed a successor before handover; the team delivered the replacement around late 2025.
Worked with managers on a performance framework, helping them apply expectations consistently, support development, and advocate for people affected by the change.
Ticketmaster / Live Nation
Live Nation Entertainment August 2004 to January 2021 Phoenix / Scottsdale, Arizona
Director, Data Engineering
July 2020 to January 2021
Manager, Data Engineering
January 2019 to July 2020
Lead Data Engineer
January 2011 to December 2018
Senior Data Warehouse Engineer
August 2004 to December 2010
Progressed from warehouse engineering to leadership of an organization of about 45 people, working with Product, Operations, Reporting, and client stakeholders on data-platform strategy and delivery.
Designed and supported ETL mappings, warehouse loading, backfills, physical database structures, and data marts, including earlier work with SAP Data Services.
Rebuilt the data model and pipelines behind client analytics serving about 10,000 venues, promoters, and artists. Reduced latency, improved performance, and made more detailed financial, sales, and attendance reporting possible.
Wrote the SQL Server exports for a company-wide financial clearing house and played an integral role in the SQL Server to Teradata and Teradata to Snowflake migrations.
Served as the sole engineer providing the fraud team's training and inference data in Snowflake, combining transaction systems, payment streams, and Accertify for models built by the fraud team.
Led consumer-side CDC reporting across roughly 500 Sybase ticketing databases in 2019. Reconstructed reporting rules in Snowflake SQL and built a parallel Kafka Streams path into PostgreSQL. Retired that alternative when the principal engineer's Snowflake path proved easier to scale and maintain, at about five minutes behind live sales.
Led delivery of a Databricks platform with sales and attendance products in six months during the pandemic in 2020. Designed the SQL-based development framework with the engineers using it, with metadata-driven scheduling, dependencies, failure notifications, and recovery.
Led migration with the platform and data-delivery teams. The comparable sales-reporting workload's annual cost fell from about $300,000 to $50,000, at about 30-second freshness.
Received two Live Nation IN awards and a Rock Star award across my time at Ticketmaster.
CompuNet Credit Services
Chief Technology Officer Previously Chief Engineer and IT Generalist December 1999 to May 2004 Lake Havasu City, Arizona
Stabilized the database and developed the systems supporting an information business serving freight carriers and brokers.
Built a web platform for data collection, report ordering, and delivery in 2000, a decade before web-based working became the norm in freight. Brought data entry, customer requests, and automated reporting into the same operation.
Helped extend the business into a two-sided information marketplace, adding carrier-performance reporting for brokers. Hired programmers and worked with a database administrator who could take responsibility for running systems while I developed new products.
The company reported revenue of $5,292,770 for the year ended 30 June 2004. First Advantage bought it in November 2004 for $18 million.
Returned for a separate follow-on consulting engagement in 2005 after employment ended.
LINKnet
Founder and Operator 1995 to 1997 Lake Havasu City, Arizona
Founded a dial-up ISP in a town of 30,000, arranging financing and carrier contracts, selecting and configuring the technical systems, and building custom racks for 48 external modems.
Built the billing system and worked with others covering customer support, the website, and the desk. Opened in May 1995 and operated the business until its sale in summer 1997.
Outside the day job
Nonprofit leadership and governance
ArtsEd West: cofounder, Business Manager, and Technology Director from June 2025. Lead business operations, budgets, technology, and organizational planning for a nonprofit connecting educators and teaching artists.
Built ArtsEd West's membership, payment, and publishing workflows, with cofounders proposing website changes through Google Sheets and reviewing them before publication. The inaugural ALL AZ Summit took place on 11 September 2026.
Desert Marigold School, operated by Valley of the Sun Waldorf Education Association: board service from around 2020, first as Treasurer, then Board President. Term ends November 2026.
Oversee governance, finance, and long-range planning, support the executive director, and turn established practices into policies that remain useful through board succession, with legal review by counsel.
Education and certification
Claude Certified Architect Professional
26 August 2026. CCAR-P.
Boston University (BUx)
MicroMasters program completion in Data Strategy, Data Platforms, and Data Analytics.
Arizona State University
Coursework toward a B.S. in Computer Information Systems / Business Information Systems.
Mohave Community College
A.A.S., General Technologies; A.A., Liberal Arts.
Technical experience
Data platforms and modeling
Snowflake, Databricks, Apache Spark, dbt Core, Kafka, Fivetran, SQL Server, Teradata, PostgreSQL, Data Vault, Kimball, and Inmon.
Engineering
SQL, Python, Java, Scala, TypeScript, Django, React, ETL/ELT, change data capture, reporting models, reconciliation, and dependency recovery.